This study assesses the long-run behaviour of long-term sovereign bond yields in OECD countries, for the period 1973-2008. We employ a dynamic panel approach, to reflect financial and economic integration, and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. Given the existence of cross-country dependence regarding the sovereign bond segment of the financial markets and its determinants, we resort to simulation and bootstrap methods for the analysis. Results show that in addition to credit and liquidity risk, and common movements in sovereign yields, investors also consider country differences arising from specific factors (inflation, budgetary and current account imbalances, and real effective exchange rates).
Non-technical summary
The idea that government debt accumulation has implications for long-term government bond interest rates is a common feature in a number of -otherwise diverse -theoretical models. The long-run relationship between fiscal variables and long-term interest rates also constitutes an important part of policymakers' conventional wisdom.
One could expect that increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio or in the government deficit ratios may imply an increase in the long-term interest rate, since it may impinge negatively on the credit risk of the sovereign debt liabilities. Indeed, market participants may perceive an additional risk stemming from the implied loosening of fiscal stance under such conditions From a policymaking point of view the relationship between government debt and deficit, and long-term interest rates is rendered timely in the context of central bank independence when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on fiscal authorities, notably to face severe economic downturns and financial disruption. In the euro area and the EU the effects of fiscal policy stance on long-term interest rates have an additional dimension. Less prudent fiscal policies are not considered to be aligned with the fiscal limits set by the Maastricht treaty. Moreover, it is often argued that large and unsustainable deficits can endanger the coherence of national macroeconomic policies and may jeopardize the price-stability oriented monetary policy.
We assess the long-run determinants of real long-term government bond yields for a set of OECD countries, employing a dynamic panel approach for the period , to test for the existence of cointegration between real long-term interest rates and its potential determinants. Furthermore, we also resort to simulation and bootstrap methods to compute the critical values and to take into account the cross-country dependences regarding this segment of the capital markets. Afterwards, we estimate the corresponding complete panel error-correction model in order to also uncover the shortrun parameters and the speed of convergence to the long-run relationship.
The panel framework allows using information contained in the cross-section dimension and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In addition, crosscountry dependence can mirror common changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities, for instance in the run-up to European and Monetary Union, the Stability and Growth Pact framework and peer pressure. Using the information contained in the cross-section dimension allows better reflecting capital markets views, due notably to financial markets integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle synchronization.
From an economic point of view, it is also relevant to find such cross-section dependence, both for the financial series and for the macroeconomic and fiscal variables. In fact, this provides evidence of significant capital market integration at the OECD level, which sovereign government debt issuers cannot discard lightly.
Moreover, the results of our analysis also show that in addition to common movements in sovereign yields, and credit and liquidity risk, investors are also aware of such country specific fundamentals as inflation, budgetary and current account imbalances, and real effective exchange rates. A better (more positive) government budget balance reduces (as expected) the real long-term interest rate in almost all countries. Moreover, the developments in current account balances also carry relevant long-run information for real interest rates. Indeed, the deterioration of the current account balance would signal a widening gap between savings and investment and longterm interest rates may be pushed upwards.
Interestingly, some long-run determinants of real long-term interest rates, which were more clearly uncovered in the panel cointegration estimation, such as liquidity, tend to be less relevant from a short-run perspective. In particular, our results illustrate that over the longer run real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants move together in this sample of OECD countries. Therefore, identifying the determinants of real long-term interest rates, over long periods as captured by the cointegration analysis, offers additional valuable information.
Introduction
One could expect that increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio or in the government deficit ratios may imply an increase in the long-term interest rate, since it may impinge negatively on the credit risk and on the quality of the outstanding sovereign debt liabilities. Indeed, market participants may perceive an additional risk stemming from the implied loosening of fiscal stance under such conditions (see Alesina et al., 1992, and Ardagna et al., 2004) . However, and as mentioned by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) , difficulties arise when assessing the fiscal effects on long-term interest rates, since interest rates are likely to be linked to fiscal policy expectations, which is not an easy concept to measure.
Apart from default or creditworthiness, liquidity risk is also relevant for sovereign bond holders. Indeed it is logical to assume that sovereign debt investors look at both credit and liquidity risk, although liquidity seems to play a bigger role in times of market unrest (see, for instance, Beber et al., 2009 ).
Moreover, several other explanations can be at the root of the long-run developments of long-term yields, in addition to fiscal fundamentals: external variables and imbalances, liquidity issues, inflation rate prospects, growth developments, and possible substitution or demonstration effects from the equity segment of the capital markets.
From a policymaking point of view the relationship between government debt and deficit, and long-term interest rates is rendered timely in the context of central bank independence when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on fiscal authorities, notably to face severe economic downturns and financial disruption. In the euro area and the EU the effects of fiscal policy stance on long-term interest rates have an additional dimension. Less prudent fiscal policies are not considered to be aligned with the fiscal limits set by the Maastricht treaty. Moreover, it is often argued that large and unsustainable deficits can endanger the coherence of national macroeconomic policies and may jeopardize the price-stability oriented monetary policy.
In this study we assess the long-run determinants of real long-term government bond yields for a set of OECD countries, employing a dynamic panel approach for the period 1973-2008, to test for the existence of cointegration between real long-term interest rates and its potential determinants. Furthermore, we also resort to simulation and bootstrap methods to compute the critical values and to take into account the crosscountry dependences regarding this segment of the capital markets. Afterwards, we estimate the corresponding complete panel error-correction model in order to also uncover the short-run parameters and the speed of convergence to the long-run relationship.
The panel framework allows using information contained in the cross-section dimension and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In addition, crosscountry dependence can mirror common changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities, for instance in the run-up to European and Monetary Union (EMU), the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) framework and peer pressure. Using the information contained in the cross-section dimension allows better reflecting capital markets views, due notably to financial markets integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle synchronization. The existence of possible cross-section dependence, naturally relevant from an economic perspective, has been essentially unaccounted for in the applied related literature. Such overlooking can lead to erroneous empirical results and less uniformed assessments since one indeed expects capital markets' variables to be rather interlinked, while co-movements and cross-country spillovers are also expected at the macro level. Therefore, we also contribute to the literature in this respect. Naturally, it is also important to i) grasp to what extent fiscal and macro variables move sovereign yields; and ii) to assess whether country differences arising from specific factors (government debt, current account balance, inflation), on top of common movements, may also be paramount regarding heterogeneous behaviour on sovereign yields. For instance, inflation and exchange rate developments can illustrate the behaviour of the monetary authorities towards price stability. In addition, in the context of financial crisis with overall risk aversion and uncertainty rising, and increasing sovereign debt issuance, good fiscal performances also becomes more relevant, from the perspective of financial markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related literature. Section three presents the empirical methodology. Section four conducts the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section five concludes the paper.
Related literature
The participants in the capital markets may perceive additional risks stemming from the loosening of fiscal policies, which would then be reflected in higher bond yields demanded from sovereign issuers. Such increased risks usually also have an adverse impact on the sovereign debt ratings. For instance, show that fiscal developments are among the relevant determinants of a country's credit rating, together with macroeconomic and government effectiveness variables.
On the other hand, capital markets may also value the increased liquidity associated to the existence of additional outstanding sovereign debt for a given country, and a decrease in the long-term yields cannot be discarded as well, given that default risk has been perceived in the past as rather mitigated in the EU context. 1 Certainly, the relationship between fiscal variables, such as government debt and budget deficits, and long-term interest rates and its several possible determinants remains largely an empirical question. Studies done in the 1980s, essentially for the US, in the context of crowding-out discussions were inspired by this debate. The related existing evidence does not seem to be clear cut in favour or against the relationship between government debt, deficit and long-term interest rates relationship.
Some more recent literature tries to assess the empirical evidence regarding notably the fiscal determinants of long-term interest rates, notably the relevance of future fiscal variables. For instance, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) , who evaluate for the US the effect of CBO budget surplus projections on interest rates spreads, conclude that higher projected surpluses imply lower spreads of long-term rates over short-term rates. Engen and Hubbard (2004) regress the current real 10-year treasury rate on CBO 5-year ahead federal debt and deficit projections, and report that increases in the expected federal debt-to-GDP ratio increase the current real 10-year Treasury yield.
Again for the US, Laubach (2009) regresses expected future interest rates on projections published by the CBO and the OMB for the deficit-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-GDP ratio 5 years ahead. According to the results, a one percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio is estimated to raise long-term interest rates by roughly 25 basis points. In addition, in related research Thomas and Wu (2009) also used fiscal projections for the US.
1 See Codogno et al. (2003) , Bernoth et al. (2004) , and Afonso and Strauch (2007) . 2 See, for instance, Evans (1985) and Wachtel, and Young (1987) .
For instance, in the context of a no-arbitrage affine term structure model for the US, Dai and Philippon (2005) also report that although the response of sovereign yields to fiscal shocks is mitigated in the shorter side of the yield curve, the response is amplified for the case of the 10-year bonds.
For the EMU countries (except Luxembourg), Faini (2006) argues that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will have a twofold effect, first on its spreads, and second on the overall level of interest rates for the currency union as a whole. Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) report that EU countries' sovereign bonds interest differentials, vis-à-vis Germany or the US, contain risk premia which increase with government debt, deficit, and debt-service, and also depend positively on liquidity, i.e. the issuer's relative bond market size.
In the European Union context, Heppke-Falk and Hüfner (2004) report that monthly deficit forecasts from financial market participants fiscal projections for France, Germany and Italy, over the period 1994-2004, have no significant effect on interest rate swap spreads of 10-year Treasury bonds. Afonso and Strauch (2007) in the context of an event-study of fiscal policy announcements in 2002, show that such fiscal events had small effects on daily swap spreads, mostly around five basis points or less.
Using high frequency daily data, from January 1999 to April 2008, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) report that for the EMU members government bond spreads react more to short-term interest rate increases when the sovereign credit risk increases and that liquidity also plays a role.
On the other hand, Afonso (2009) , using a panel of semi-annual vintages of growth and fiscal forecasts of the European Commission, shows that 10-year government bond yields increase with better growth forecasts, and with decreases in budget balance-to-GDP ratios, signalling that sovereigns may need to pay more to finance anticipated higher budget deficits in the market. Table 1 offers a summary of some of the findings in the abovementioned related literature, within different methodological frameworks. Interestingly, from the studies surveyed, the concern regarding the assessment of possible cross-section dependences and its technical, empirical, and economic implications for the analysis seems to be essentially absent. 
Empirical methodology
In the subsequent empirical analysis, an initial baseline specification for the real long-term government bond yield, r, can be written as
where i is the long-term nominal government bond yield,  is the inflation rate, and X includes a set of additional explanatory variables. The index i (i=1,…, N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…, T) indicates the period,  i stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i, and it is assumed that the disturbances u it follow the standard assumptions.
An error-correction form for (1) whereby real long-term interest rates move towards their long-run level with a speed of adjustment , is given by
where the disturbances v it are assumed to follow the standard assumptions.
Specification (1) illustrates a long-run relationship for the long-term real government bond yield. Among the several long-run factors influencing the long-term real interest rate that are included in X, we consider such determinants as: the government balance-to-GDP ratio, the debt-to-GDP ratio, stock price developments, the current account balance ratio, inflation expectations, and the real effective exchange rate, and liquidity and regional real interest rate measures.
As mentioned above, financial markets want to differentiate among sovereign debt issuers due to the existence of different country-specific credit risk and of a non-zero probability of sovereign default. Therefore, such variables as the government balance and the debt-to-GDP ratios could convey relevant information regarding a country credit risk and help in explaining cross-country financial risk premia. On the other hand, we do not want to expand too much the possible set of variables since we are aiming at a parsimonious empirical specification, while for the purposes of the subsequent error correction analysis it is also preferable not to have too may variables.
In addition, such fiscal indicators also allow financial markets to assess the fiscal future developments in sovereign borrowers and its perceived credit risk, the country's long-run solvency, and repayment likelihood. Therefore, this helps assessing whether a country's debt burden and its public finance behaviour are sustainable, or if the risk for a build-up of government debt arises.
be discarded. Moreover, expected inflation is also seen as an indicator of macroeconomic stability, and higher inflation implies higher sovereign risk. Inflation expectations can be assumed from the actual inflation rate (or taken as an average of past n yearly observations).
In addition, the external imbalance of a country, for instance as proxied by the current account balance-to-GDP ratio, can convey the existence of a gap between saving and investment and provide expectations regarding a future depreciation of the domestic currency. Under those circumstances the risk premia demanded by the markets on sovereign debt may also increase. Moreover, external imbalances tend to be linked to fiscal imbalances from a long-term perspective, notably when private saving does not increase sufficiently to offset the effects of increased budget deficits, and then they may also impinge via such channel on long-term bond yields.
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In addition, real effective exchange rate developments are linked to a country's foreign competitiveness while being also linked to current account balance positions.
Sovereign debt yields also tend to be related to the depth or liquidity of the respective outstanding bond market. Indeed, liquidity risk is usually inversely related to the size of the respective market Therefore, it seems also useful to consider a measure of liquidity as a possible determinant of long-term government bond yields. Our liquidity measure, Debtliq it , is given by the share of outstanding government debt in country i, in year t, in the overall outstanding government debt of the full set of countries in our sample:
where the index i=1, …, N indicates the country.
We also construct a regional real interest rate, a measure of contagion and crosscountry dependence (for instance, Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) use a somewhat related construction). The so-called regional real interest rate for country i in period t is the weighted average of the real interest rates (r it ) in all the other N-1 countries, excluding country i. The weights that we use are the shares (Debt jt ) of each country's outstanding sovereign debt in the sum of total government debt for all the countries considered in the sample:
Naturally, one has to be aware that full liberalisation and integration of capital and bond markets was not in place for the entire time sample under analysis. Indeed, capital markets were gradually liberalised in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a mandatory requirement for EU countries at the start of stage two of EMU (1994) . Another caveat is the fact that some home bias can arise among investors, for instance, some institutional investors may face constraints leading to portfolio investments in the home country.
Finally, and once we have estimated the long-run relationships between real longterm interest rates and their potential determinants, we will also estimate the complete panel error-correction model given by equation (2).
Empirical analysis

Data
In our analysis we consider, for the period 1973-2008, the following set of 17 OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, and U.S. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 From a simple visual inspection we can observe an upward movement in real long-term interest rates until the beginning of the 1980s, followed by a subsequent downward trend until the end of the time sample. Real long-term interest rates have been essentially positive apart from the period of the seventies and early eighties, when high inflation rates were also prevalent, particularly in such countries as Finland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.
Regarding the liquidity measure that we computed following (3), Table 1 shows that the U.S. and Japan accounted in 2008 for more than half of the outstanding stock of sovereign debt in the set of OECD countries considered in our country sample.
We build inflation expectations ( e ) taking the difference between actual inflation and a 2-year moving average of past inflation (see Appendix 1 for data sources). 
Cross-section dependence and panel unit root results
In recent years it has become more widely recognized that the advantages of panel unit root tests within the macro-panel setting include the use of data for which the spans of individual time series data are insufficient for the study of many hypotheses of interest. The adoption of such new panel data methods is preferred to the usual time series techniques to circumvent the well known problems associated with the low power of traditional unit root tests. Therefore the body of literature on panel unit root and panel cointegration testing has grown considerably in the past ten years and now distinguishes between: first-generation tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999 , Levin et al., 2002 , and Im et al., 2003 developed on the assumption of the cross-sectional independence of panel units (except for common time effects), which is often unrealistic in many empirical settings; and second-generation tests (Bai and Ng, 2004 , Smith et al., 2004 , Moon and Perron, 2004 , Choi, 2006 , and Pesaran, 2007 allowing for a variety of dependence across the different units. These tests differ according to the way they eliminate the factors of structural dependence and the way they aggregate the individual information. 6 Therefore, the first question to deal with is the possible presence of cross-section dependence in the data. Indeed, as put in evidence for instance, by O'Connell (1998) Consequently, the implementation of second-generation panel unit root tests is desirable only when it has been established that the panel is effectively subject to a significant degree of error cross-section dependence. In the cases where cross-section dependence is not sufficiently high, loss of power might result if second-generation panel unit root tests that allow for cross-section dependence are used. Therefore, before an appropriate choice of a panel unit root test is made it is crucial to provide some evidence on the degree of residual cross-section dependence.
One way of testing for the presence of cross-section dependence in the data is to carry out the test of Pesaran (2004) and to compute the Cross section Dependence (CD) statistic. The test of Pesaran (2004) is based on a simple average of all pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals (e it ) obtained from standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) regressions for each individual in the panel. Denoting by ij  the sample estimate of the pair-wise correlation coefficient for the residuals for countries i and j calculated over T periods, we get:
The test statistic proposed by Pesaran (2004) , which does not depend on any particular spatial weight matrix when the cross-sectional dimension (N) is large, is given by 6 Note that a specific form of cross-sectional dependence that has become popular is the factor structure approach. This has been used extensively in empirical work (see, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and it has been analysed in theoretical treatments at even greater length. Therefore, in our study we use the notions of error cross-sectional dependence and factor structure dependence interchangeably.
and under its null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence it follows asymptotically a two-tailed standard normal distribution. The results reported in Table 2 provide evidence in favour of the existence of cross-sectional dependence in the data since for all series the CD statistics are always highly significant whatever the number of lags (from 1 to 4) included in the ADF regressions. In other words, one rejects the null hypothesis of cross-section independence Having put in evidence the presence of cross section dependence in real long-term interest rates, we now turn to the determination of the degree of integration of the series (real long-term interest rate, government balance ratio, current account balance, inflation expectation, real effective exchange rate, liquidity debt share, debt ratio, regional real interest rate) in our panel of 17 countries, using two second-generation panel unit root tests. by Solo (1984) , max is the test of Leybourne (1995) , and min = Table 3 and provide support of the existence of a unit root in all series under consideration. This conclusion, which is robust to the number of lags introduced in the ADF regressions (from p=1 to 4), should be considered as safe given the large and significant degree of cross-section dependence in all series documented in Table 2 . Notes: 1) A constant is included in the estimations. 2) Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country. 3) Critical values are respectively of -2.40 at 1%, -2.22 at 5%, and -2.14 at 10%. * denotes rejection of the null at the 10 % significance level. CIPS -Cross-section augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin test. CIPS* -truncated CIPS test. Table 4 , suggest that for all the series the unit root null cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level by the four bootstrap tests of Smith et al (2004) . Therefore, we conclude that real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants (government balance ratio, current account balance ratio, inflation expectations, real effective exchange rate, liquidity debt share, government debt ratio, and regional real interest rate) are non-stationary and integrated of order one at the five percent level of significance in our country panel. The order of the sieve is permitted to increase with the number of time series observations at the rate T 1/3 while the lag length of the individual unit root test regressions are determined using the Campbell and Perron (1991) procedure. Each test regression is fitted with a constant term only. 8 We have of course also checked using the tests by Pesaran (2007) and the bootstrap tests of Smith et al. (2004) that the first difference of the series are stationary, hence confirming that the series expressed in level are integrated of order one. 
Similar results in
Panel cointegration and estimation of long-run parameters
Given that all the series under investigation are integrated of order one, we now use the bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) to test for the existence of cointegration between real long-term interest rates and its potential determinants. In conjecture with equation (1) The panel cointegration results from the asymptotic tests shown in Table 5 (including also additional specifications whose SUR estimations are reported in Appendix 2, sets X 7 , X 8 , and X 9 ), for a model including either a constant term or a linear trend, clearly indicate the absence of a cointegrating relationship between real long-term interest rates and the different sets of potential determinants for our country panel. However, this result is based on conventional asymptotic critical values that are calculated on the assumption of cross-sectional independence of countries, an assumption that is not true here given the significant cross-sectional correlation among the series documented previously in Table 2 . Those SUR estimation results are reported in Table 6 , for the specification with the current account balance and government debt ratios. From Table 6 we can observe that real long-term interest rates are statistically and positively affected by changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio for 12 out of 17 countries. Regarding inflation expectations they have a negative and statistically significant effect on real long-term interest rates in 10 countries and a positive effect in the US, UK, Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg. In addition, the effect of the external imbalances is statistically significant and negative (positive) for ten (four) countries. In other words, improvements in the external balance reduce (increase) real long-term interest rates in ten (four) countries.
Moreover, increases in the debt ratio push up long-term interest rates in eleven countries. The developments in current account balances also carry relevant long-run information for real interest rates. Indeed, the deterioration of the current account balance would signal a widening gap between savings and investment and long-term interest rates may be pushed upwards. The SUR results of a similar specification are reported in Table 7 where the debtratio is replaced by the government budget balance ratio. In this case, a better (more positive) government budget balance reduces (as expected) the real long-term interest rate in almost all countries
In Table 8 , the SUR estimations include simultaneously two fiscal determinants of real long-term interest rates, the government budget balance ratio and the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the real effective exchange rate. According to the results, improvements in the government budget balance again reduce the real long-term interest rate in ten countries, in a statistically significant way, while for the other three countries it lacks statistical significance, although the sign is also negative. The real effective exchange rate is more often not statistically significant, having a negative effect in six countries, with a depreciation reducing real long-term interest rates in the cointegration relationship. Regarding the regional real interest rate, its relevance is assessed in Table 9 , where this determinant of the real long-term interest rate is added to the specification reported in Table 8 , and where we drop the real effective exchange rate. Therefore, and according to the results of Table 9 , we can indeed observe a statistically positive effect of the regional real interest rate on the country specific real interest rate for all countries (except Ireland). Moreover, the main results observed before in terms of the other determinants (inflation expectation, current account balance, government balance and debt ratios) also hold. Concerning the relevance of the liquidity of the outstanding government debt, defined in (3), as a determinant of long-term government bond yields, the related results are reported in Table 10 , considering the debt-to-GDP ratio a determinant as well. From Table 10 we can observe that inflation expectations have now a statistically significant negative effect on real long-term interest rates in all countries, while higher debt ratios also imply higher long-term interest rates for most countries. In addition, the effect of an increased country specific sovereign liquidity in the government debt market contributes to reduce long-term interest rates in six cases.
A similar set of results can be observed in Table 11 , where the current account and government budget balance ratios are now considered as determinants. According to this empirical evidence, the improvement of the fiscal position contributes to reduce long-term interest rates in 13 cases, while a better current account position also negatively impinges on long-term interest rates in seven countries. In this specification, the result regarding the expected negative effect of the liquidity proxy on long-term interest rates still holds for basically the same six countries. Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced system, total observations: 612.
Error-correction form
In the previous sub-section we have estimated the long-run relationships between real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants for our panel of 17 OECD Tables 6 to 11 ). We now turn to the estimation of the complete panel error-correction model given by equation (2), that is
to obtain the estimates of the loading factor  (weights or error correction parameters, or speed of adjustment to the equilibrium values), as well as of the short-run parameters j  and j  . Therefore, we recover from each of the 17 cointegration relations the respective estimated coefficients in order to construct the residual quantity ( )
 . Afterwards, we estimate a complete VAR in first differences, with country effects, α i , with the necessary lags of the abovementioned residual variable. The lag length structure k is chosen using the Schwarz (SC) and
Hannan-Quinn (HQ) selection criteria, and by carrying out a standard likelihood ratio testing-down type procedure to examine the lag significance from a long-lag structure (started with k=6) to a more parsimonious one. Afterwards, in order to improve the statistical specification of the model, we implemented systematically Wald tests of exclusion of variables from the short-run dynamic (they are not reported here) to eliminate insignificant short-run estimates at the 5% level. The results of the estimations using Full Information Maximum Likelihood are reported in the tables below for the different sets of potential determinants (X it ) previously considered.
In Table 12 we report the results (showing only significant short-run estimates at the 5% level) of the alternative error-correction estimations based on (2) for our country sample. r -real long-term interest rate; CA -current account balance;  e -inflation expectations; DR -debt ratio; GBR -budget balance ratio; Reg_R -regional interest rate proxy; TCR -real effective exchange rate. Liquidity -liquidity proxy based on the debt share.
According to the results, inflation has a significant short-run effect on real longterm sovereign yields, and a fall in inflation expectations would then imply a decline in real rates. Interestingly, the long-run effect associated with the panel results in Table 12 , can in this case be computed to be around -0.4. This is in line with the long-run cointegration relationship reported for the countries in the previous SUR analysis, and implies that an increase in inflation expectations of 1 percentage point could lead to a long-run decline of around 0.4 percentage point in the real long-term interest rate.
Regarding the short-run effects of the fiscal determinants we can also observe that an improvement of the government budget balance reduces the real interest rate. On the other hand, the government debt ratio shows up in the short-run estimated coefficients with positive sign at one lag, implying some upward pressure on the real interest rate, and also with a negative sign at the fourth lag, which could eventually be related to gains from liquidity. Interestingly, our liquidity proxy does not show up as statistically significant in the error-correction estimations, implying that such determinant is more relevant from a long-term perspective, as already seen before in the long-run estimation results. Naturally, we can not discard different perceptions towards liquidity if financial conditions are extremely disruptive as for instance, in a financial crisis.
The proxy for the regional interest rate also has the expected direct short-run effect, illustrating to some extent the existence of both common movements and spillover effects in the long-term side of the yield curve. The real effective exchange rate depreciation movements push up the real interest rate, which may reflect higher exchange risk linked to external imbalances. Finally, the magnitude of the speed of adjustment across the several error-correction specifications is rather similar.
Conclusion
In this paper we assessed the long-run behaviour of long-term government bond yields for a set of 17 OECD countries, for the period 1973-2008. We employed a dynamic panel approach, in order to reflect financial and economic integration, and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. We also used simulation and bootstrap methods to compute the critical values, and to take into account the crosscountry dependences in the sovereign bond segment of the capital markets. Indeed, as put in evidence in the literature, panel unit root tests of the first generation can lead to spurious results if one ignores the existence of significant degrees of positive error cross-section dependence (reflecting, for instance, financial markets integration and liberalisation, or increased business cycle synchronization). From an economic point of view, it is relevant to find indeed such cross-section dependence, both for the financial series and for the macroeconomic and fiscal variables. In fact, this provides evidence of significant capital markets integration at the OECD level, which sovereign government debt issuers cannot discard lightly.
Moreover, the results of our analysis also show that in addition to common movements in sovereign yields, and credit and liquidity risk, investors are also aware of such country specific factors as inflation, budgetary and current account imbalances, and real effective exchange rates. A better (more positive) government budget balance reduces, as expected, the real long-term interest rate in almost all countries.
Additionally, the developments in current account balances also carry relevant long-run information for real interest rates. Indeed, the deterioration of the current account balance would signal a widening gap between savings and investment and long-term interest rates may be pushed upwards.
Interestingly, some long-run determinants of real long-term interest rates, which were more clearly uncovered in the panel cointegration estimation, such as liquidity, tend to be less relevant from a short-run perspective. In particular, our results illustrate that over the longer run real long-term interest rates and their potential determinants move together in this sample of OECD countries. Therefore, identifying the determinants of real long-term interest rates, over long periods as captured by the cointegration analysis, offers additional valuable information notably for financing choices decisions by the sovereign issuers and government investment decisions.
From a policymaking point of view the relationship between fiscal and external imbalances and long-term interest rates is timely in the context of economic and financial uncertainty, when pressures for macroeconomic activism are exercised on fiscal authorities, increasing short-and medium-term fiscal risks. Furthermore, it is often argued that large and unsustainable fiscal deficits can endanger the coherence of national macroeconomic policies and may jeopardize the price-stability objectives of a monetary union.
Regarding future work, we could envisage evaluating the data at different frequencies depending on the time-span and variable availability. Indeed, mixed frequencies can, to some extent be recovered for the relevant financial and macro variables, and the issue has not been dealt in the existing literature at length 
Appendix 2 -Additional results
